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The Iraq Study Group Report flew out of the hands of the Baker Commission and is now available on the internet.

I have read much of the 160 page document and this is my analysis to how it relates to the media and the political direction in Iraq.

I watched the various press reports and the Baker group is being a bit forthcoming in their assessments but they are careful to present a unified message. This is a bit different than the whitewash we saw on the 9-11 commission report.

Early reports that were leaked this morning included the following line that was directly from the report.

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq.

While some stopped there others included the full context.

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.

Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support.

No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States has special obligations.

Our country must address as best it can Iraq’s many problems. The United States has long-term relationships and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged.

This is an important distinction. While the press falls all over themselves to paint these events as a failure for the Bush administration it is important to note that the Baker commission hasn’t entirely relegated themselves to the notion that we have already lost in Iraq. They are being cautiously pessimistic by speaking about solutions with the emphasis that no solution is perfect. The emphasis is on change (real or imagined), accountability and making the situation better.

This speaks volumes about the mainstream media and the way they have covered the war since it began. Part of winning the war includes winning the war on propaganda.

While the commission speaks about our leaders need to be forthcoming it is important to note that the press has done everything in their power to undermine honest assessments in Iraq. The simple statement about serving “American interests” must have many of them beside themselves in a tizzy of manufactured outrage. We will have to watch for these sentiments to ooze out of the festering sores of the American left who wanted ever so desperately to pick up and ship out immediately.

On Diplomacy

This may be one of the most troubling aspects of the report. It calls for greater involvement of Iran and Syria – the two countries that have had an integral hand in taking advantage of the situation by feeding the insurgency with arms and support. In essence this seems like we are saying that they won in those efforts and the prize is that we will sit down and talk things out with them.

Yet all is not lost on this front. It includes language that those countries may not be willing to meet. Especially the part about recognizing Israel’s right to exist as well as other incentives including dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Update: I need to finish this thought. - Perhaps this is a setup for cooperation by those governments. My comments should not be misinterpreted to imply that diplomacy is bad. On the contrary I believe it is important. But diplomacy is a two way street and our needs are best met if we remove destabilizing forces in the Iraq. This directly translates to eliminating undermining elements from Iran and Syria so we can deal with sectarian violence in a more constructive manner.

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq.

There is not much room for an alternative on this front because we haven’t displayed the political will to deal effectively with these countries while they undermined our efforts over the last couple of years. Hopefully we don’t follow this up by completely giving them the keys to the hen house.

On the Iraqi Government

Clearly there is a need to force the Iraqi government to be more accountable. This strategy involves helping the government assume more responsibility as well as allowing coalition efforts to move forward with or without the cooperation of the Iraqi government. This is important - gone should be the days where elements of the Iraqi government make statements that undermine the forces as we have repeatedly seen since the new government took over.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an open ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

The key to these recommendations is the emphasis on cooperation and the fact that there is no longer an open ended commitment.

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

The specific recommendation has been keyed on by the press and I present it here:

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

This pretty much sums up the executive summary. We will update these assessments as we read the rest of the 160 page document.

Others Covering this Story: Michelle Malkin, The Political Pit Bull, Macsmind, Good Richards Almanac, Hot Air, Mary Katharine Ham, FullosseousFlap’s Dental Blog, Right Wing Nuthouse

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